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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. 
Whether service of process was sufficient giving the 
trial court jurisdiction to enter the default judgment. The 
standard of review is whether the judge acted in accord with the 
law; the judge is not allowed any discretion, and no deference is 
given to the judge's ruling. State Dept. of Social Service v. 
Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989). 
II. 
Whether defendant adequately met its burden of proof 
and persuasion in its motion to overcome the presumption of valid 
jurisdiction. The standard of review is whether the judge acted 
in accord with the law; the judge is not allowed any discretion, 
and no deference is given to the judge's ruling. State Dept. of 
Social Service v. Viiil. 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989). 
III. 
Whether service of process upon Nu Skin's employee was 
valid under the doctrine of apparent authority. The standard of 
review is whether the judge acted in accord with the law; the 
5 
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judge is not allowed any discretion, and no deference is given to 
the judge's ruling. State Dept. of Social Service v. Viiil, 784 
P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989). 
IV. 
Whether the Judge abused his discretion in denying 
counsel the opportunity to argue against the motion, in summarily 
granting the motion to quash service of process, and in denying 
counsel the opportunity to take discovery, including the 
deposition of Rob Mullins of Nu Skin. The standard of review is 
whether the trial court judge abused his discretion. Birch v. 
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989). 
V. 
Whether the Judge abused his discretion in awarding 
attorney fees in the matter. The standard of review is whether 
the trial court judge abused his discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 
P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 
163 (Utah App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Counsel believes there are no determinative 
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules in this 
matter. 
6 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the orders of Judge Rokich of 
the Third District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, granting the 
Motion of defendant-appellee Nu Skin International, Inc. ("Nu 
Skin") seeking to quash service of process following entry of a 
default judgment against it, and further awarding Nu Skin costs 
of $1,000.00. The facts relevant to the appeal are that the 
lawsuit below was filed on January 29, 1992 wherein plaintiff 
sought recovery against defendant Nedra Roney (not served below) 
and Nu Skin for damages resulting from claims of Defamation, 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Tortious 
Interference with Advantageous Economic Relations, Services 
Provided on Open Account, Collection on a Promissory Note, 
various Breaches of Agreements and common law Fraud. (See 
complaint)• 
In February, 1992, a copy of the summons and complaint, 
together with an "Acceptance of Service" form, and a letter from 
appellant's counsel was sent to Mr. Steven Lund, the registered 
agent for Nu Skin, asking that he sign the Acceptance of Service 
form and respond to the complaint. (Affidavit of Jeffrey B. 
Brown, paragraph 2 and copies attached thereto). He chose not to 
respond to the summons and complaint, but sent it to Nu Skin 
7 
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counsel in California. Nu Skin counsel also chose not to respond 
to the complaint. (Affidavit of Steven J. Lund, paragraph 4). 
When no response was forthcoming, on March 23, 1992, a 
Utah County Deputy Sheriff traveled to the Nu Skin's headquarters 
in Provo, Utah, with instructions to serve Steve Lund, the 
registered agent for Nu Skin, and if he could not be found, to 
otherwise comply with the provisions of Rule 4(e)(5), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. (Affidavit of Sheriff, paragraph 4). Upon 
arriving at the Nu Skin headquarters, the Deputy was ultimately 
directed to a Nu Skin employee, Rob Mullins, who expressly 
represented to the Deputy that he could accept the summons and 
complaint as part of his official duties. After inquiring into 
his name and position, and based upon his express 
representations, the Deputy served Mr. Mullins with the summons 
and complaint as an agent of the corporation. (Affidavit of 
Sheriff, paragraphs 6 through 9). 
On May 22, 1992, the trial court entered a default 
judgment against the defendant Nu Skin International, Inc. after 
it failed to appear in the action, despite being served with 
legal process and despite having been sent a Notice of Intent to 
Enter Default by appellants former counsel. Thereafter, Nu Skin 
filed a motion to quash service of process—claiming the person 
served at Nu Skin was not authorized to accept service of process 
8 
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on behalf of Nu Skin—seeking to set aside the default judgment 
and seeking an award of attorney fees. Conspicuously absent from 
discussion in this motion was any discussion or evidence 
concerning what the Nu Skin employee did with the summons and 
complaint after he received it. A hearing was held on said 
motion, during which counsel was denied the opportunity to argue 
against the motion, and during which the Judge denied counsel the 
opportunity to take the deposition of Rob Mullins, the Nu Skin 
employee served. The motion quashing service of process was 
granted by Judge Rokich, and subsequently the Judge entered an 
order awarding defendant $1,000.00 in attorney fees, ostensibly 
for the bad faith of counsel for appellant under Rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in obtaining the default judgment. The 
court finally ruled on all issues on August 3, 1992, and this 
appeal was thereafter taken and the Notice of Appeal was filed on 
September 1, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The service of process in this case was sufficient 
giving the trial court jurisdiction to enter the default judgment 
and service of process upon Nu Skin's employee was valid under 
the doctrine of apparent authority. Further, the defendant Nu 
Skin failed to adequately meet its burden of proof and persuasion 
in its motion to overcome the presumption of valid jurisdiction 
9 
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in having the default judgment set aside. Further, Judge Rokich 
abused his discretion in denying counsel the opportunity to argue 
against the motion to set aside the default judgment, in 
summarily granting the motion to quash service of process and in 
denying counsel the opportunity to take discovery, including the 
deposition of Rob Mullins of Nu Skin, the person upon whom 
service of process was made. Finally, Judge Rokich abused his 
discretion in awarding attorney fees in the matter against 
plaintiff's counsel for having the default judgment entered. 
ARGUMENT 
I., II. AND III. 
THE DEFENDANT NU SKIN FAILED TO ADEQUATELY MEET ITS 
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PERSUASION IN ITS MOTION TO 
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF VALID JURISDICTION IN 
HAVING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE. 
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON NU SKIN'S EMPLOYEE WAS VALID 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY. 
THE SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THIS CASE WAS SUFFICIENT 
GIVING THE TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Nu Skin's sole argument for its Motion to Quash service 
of process was that Rob Mullins, the person served with the 
Summons and Complaint by Deputy Sheriff JoAnn Murphy of the Utah 
County Sheriffs Office was not an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or was not otherwise authorized to receive service of 
process for Nu Skin. However, in making this argument, Nu Skin 
10 
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did not submit an Affidavit of Rob Mullins and the trial court 
refused to allow counsel for appellant to conduct any discovery 
or take the deposition of Rob Mullins. According to the 
Affidavit of Deputy Murphy, she traveled to Nu Skin's corporate 
office in Provo, and was directed to Rob Mullins who stated that 
he could accept service, that his official title was order 
processor, but that he had other duties as well. After service 
of the Summons and Complaint on Mr. Mullins, Nu Skin still failed 
to make any response or appear in the case and default judgment 
was sought. An Affidavit of Deputy Murphy, dated May 12, 1992, 
was filed with the court and a Notice of Intent to default was 
sent to Nu Skin. After reviewing the Affidavit of Deputy Murphy 
and Notice of Intent, the trial court entered a default judgment 
against Nu Skin for failure to appear in the action. This was 
more than two months after service was completed. Nu Skin 
attempted to make it appear as though Appellant was using games 
of deceit or tricks or pulling a fast one on the court in having 
the default judgment entered. This was not the case as appellant 
complied with all rules of procedure and practice in having the 
default certificate and default judgment entered, and further 
complied with additional requests of the trial court that a 
Notice of Intent to take Default be sent and further that an 
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Affidavit of the Deputy Sheriff be obtained explaining why she 
served the person that she did serve. 
Rule 4(e)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(U.R.C.P.) provides that a summons and complaint may be served 
upon any corporation by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, 
a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized to receive 
service or if no such officer can be found then upon the person 
in charge of such office or place of business. 
Nu Skin claimed that the responsibilities and duties of 
Rob Mullins did not include acceptance of service of process. Nu 
Skin further claimed that these facts were uncontroverted in the 
lower court, but without basis in fact. At the trial court 
level, Nu Skin artfully skirted the issue of what ultimately 
happened to the summons and complaint served on Rob Mullins. Mr. 
Lund, the registered agent, merely stated that he had "never been 
personally served with the Summons and Complaint in the present 
action." (Affidavit of Steven Lund, paragraphs 3 and 5.) He 
never stated that he did not receive the copy of the Summons and 
Complaint that was served upon Rob Mullins. Nowhere is this 
possibility factually denied. No Affidavit from Mr. Mullins was 
ever filed with the court in support of Nu Skin's motion. In 
fact, appellant's counsel requested an opportunity to depose and 
question Mr. Mullins, but was refused the opportunity to do so by 
12 
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the court. Nu Skin failed to submit any affidavit or sworn 
statement by Mr. Mullins concerning his duties and 
responsibilities, in spite of a sworn affidavit by a Utah County 
Sheriff Officer, that Mr. Mullins expressly represented to the 
officer that he had authority to accept service. 
Rule 4(e)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(U.R.C.P.) provides that a summons and complaint may be served 
upon any corporation by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, 
a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized to receive 
service or if no such officer can be found then upon the person 
in charge of such office or place of business. The affidavit of 
Steven J. Lund does not even deny that Mr. Mullins might have 
been someone "in charge of such office or place of business." It 
merely states that he "does not supervise personnel, operations, 
or any other aspect of Nu Skin's business." (Paragraph 7). 
In considering motions to set aside a default judgment, 
such as Nu Skin's, the issue is essentially one of jurisdiction. 
Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290 (Utah 1986). Unlike motions 
to vacate default judgments for other reasons, a resolution of a 
motion to vacate a default judgment based upon lack of 
jurisdiction is a matter of law, not discretion. State Dept. of 
Social Services v. Vinil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
13 
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Further, the opposing party must overcome the presumption of 
valid jurisdiction. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Viiil; 
When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been 
entered by a court of general jurisdiction, the law 
presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on 
the party attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence. 
[Citations omitted]. 
Viiil, 784 P.2d at 1133. 
While there appear to be no Utah cases directly on 
point—i.e., concerning service of process based on the apparent 
authority of a domestic corporation's employee—other 
jurisdictions have ruled directly on the issue. In those cases, 
the courts have held that employees with apparent authority to 
accept service of process will be deemed to have actual 
authority, and the service of process will be valid. 
Illustrative of that sound jurisprudential principle is 
the case of Leo v. General Electric Co., Ill F.R.D. 407 (E.D.N.Y. 
1986), where the court held that service upon a clerical employee 
who held herself out to be authorized to accept service, was 
sufficient service of process. In Leo, the process server went 
to one of G.E.'s many office and was directed by an employee in 
the main lobby to call Mr. Bob Malool from the lobby phone. 
Using the phone, the process server spoke with Mr. Malool's 
secretary who, after meeting him in the lobby, told him she could 
accept the papers. To his question she answered affirmatively 
14 
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that she was authorized to accept the papers, and so he served 
her. G.E. maintained that this service was not valid; however, 
the court found valid and sufficient service under the doctrine 
of apparent authority. 
The court held that while the secretary was not a 
"managing agent" under the Rule 4(e)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. (which 
is virtually identical to the Rule 4(e)(5) U.R.C.P.), the 
employee's apparent authority validated the delivery. Where the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially identical to the 
Federal Rules, the court will "freely refer to authorities which 
have interpreted the federal rule." Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 
P.2d 690, 693 (Utah App. 1992). 
In regard to the employee's apparent authority, the 
court in Leo noted: 
Although the secretary was not an agent for process 
under [the Rules], the service was made in a manner 
which, objectively viewed, was calculated to give the 
corporation fair notice of the lawsuit...When a process 
server acts reasonably in serving a corporate employee 
who displays apparent authority to accept such service, 
the fault lies with the defendant corporation and 
service will be upheld. [Emphasis added]. 
Leo, 111 F.R.D. at 411-412 (quoting Fashion Page Ltd. v. Zurich 
Insurance Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 273-274, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 406 
N.E.2d 747 (1980). In addition, the Leo court found that the 
process server acted diligently to effect service of process and 
stated: 
15 
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...if a corporation is subject to jurisdiction, and if 
the summons is effectively delivered to a servable 
official, the better approach is to seek to sustain 
jurisdiction rather than become bogged down in highly 
cerebral distinctions between types of agents. 
Leo, 111 F.R.D. at 413 (quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 311, McLaughlin 
Practical Commentary (McKinney 1972). The solid rule set forth 
in Fashion Page and Leo on apparent authority continue to be 
followed in New York. The court in M. Prusman, Ltd. v. Ariel 
Maritime Group, Inc., 719 F.Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), stated: 
Recognizing that a 'process server cannot be expected 
to know the corporation's internal practices,'...valid 
service [is found] where 'the process server has gone 
to [the corporation's] offices, made proper inquiry of 
the defendant's own employees, and delivered the 
summons according to their directions.' 
Prusman, at 220, quoting Fashion Page, 50 N.Y.2d 265, 406 N.E.2d 
747, 751, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 894). 
In the present case, Deputy Sheriff Murphy went to the 
corporate offices of the defendant, and there was directed to the 
floor of Nu Skin's corporate headquarters to effect service. At 
that location, Mr. Mullins represented to the Deputy that he had 
authority to accept the summons and complaint on behalf of Nu 
Skin. As in Leo, the employee expressly represented that he had 
apparent authority to a process server who was acting properly 
and diligently. If Rob Mullins did not in fact have actual 
authority, as Nu Skin only partially contended at the trial court 
level, the fault leading to the default judgment lies with Nu 
16 
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Skin and its employees, and service should have been upheld by 
the trial court judge as a matter of law. 
The apparent authority doctrine has also been favorably 
applied in other jurisdictions to support service, rather than to 
defeat it on hyper-technical and strained grounds. In Henderson 
v. Cherry, Beakaert & Holland, 932 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 199), the 
Eleventh Circuit held that service upon a non-partner employee of 
an accounting firm constituted valid service of process, because 
the person's "position is such as to afford reasonable assurance 
that he will inform his principal that such process has been 
served upon him." Henderson, 932 F.2d at 1412 (quoting Scott v. 
Atlanta Dairies Coop., 239 Ga. 721, 724, 238 S.E.2d 340, 343 
(1977). Similarly, in Merrill Chadwick Co. v. October Oil Co., 
725 P.2d 17 (Colo. 1986), the court held that the representation 
by the secretary of the registered agent, that she had authority 
to accept service and the fact that she did accept service, was 
sufficient to uphold service. On that basis, the court denied 
the motion to set aside the default judgment. 
In these cases dealing with apparent authority, courts 
uphold service where, as in the instant case, it is likely that 
the notice will reach and does reach the intended party. Indeed, 
in the present case, the record is factually devoid of any 
evidence that the summons and complaint served on Mr. Rob Mullins 
17 
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did not in fact reach the intended party and Nu Skin has failed 
to meet its burden of proof and persuasion on that critical 
issue. 
It is undisputed, however that the notice was designed 
to reach Nu Skin through service by a deputy sheriff, after Nu 
Skin refused to accept service of process through mail sent to 
Steven Lund, the registered agent of Nu Skin. Nu Skin knew 
informally of the existence of the complaint, but chose to do 
nothing in regard to it. After service of process upon Rob 
Mullins, again Nu Skin failed to take any action to protect it 
from entry of a default judgment. Only after entry of said 
judgment, and prior to any action by appellant to enforce said 
judgment, Nu Skin moved to set aside the default judgment. 
Further support for appellant's position is found in 
Jordan v. United States, 694 F.2d 833 (D.C. Circ. 1982), where, 
as in our case, service was first attempted by mail. Later, the 
plaintiff's attorney invoked the process of the U.S. Marshall's 
office to effect service. The United States moved to quash 
service as being deficient and not in accord with the rules. The 
court held: 
Where the necessary parties in the government have 
actual notice of a suit, suffer no prejudice from a 
technical defect in service, and there is justifiable 
excuse for the failure to serve properly, courts should 
not...constru[e] [the federal rules] so rigidly or...so 
narrowly. 
18 
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Jordan, 694 F.2d at 836. 
In the present case, Nu Skin received actual notice by 
mail, which is admitted in the Affidavit of Steven Lund. He 
further stated that he turned the same over to Nu Skin's 
attorney, who did nothing with the same. Personal service was 
subsequently made upon an employee at the corporate headquarters 
of Nu Skin who expressly represented that he had authority to 
accept service. Later, a Notice of Intent to take default was 
mailed to Nu Skin, and then finally, an Affidavit of the Deputy 
Sheriff was obtained in order to get the court to enter the 
default judgment. Appellant complied with all of the rules of 
procedure in obtaining the default. 
Nu Skin's technical argument that the employee served 
was "clerical" and thus could not, under Rule 4(e)(5) U.R.C.P., 
accept process, is incorrect. While service on a "managing 
agent" would undoubtedly be effective service under the rules, 
the fact that an employee is not a "managing agent" does not mean 
that he may not also accept service. An employee, even a 
"clerical" employee, may be authorized to accept service and, as 
the cases quoted abundantly demonstrated, may have apparent 
authority to accept service even when he has no actual authority. 
This is particularly so where the employee at corporate 
19 
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headquarters expressly represents to a diligent process server 
that he is authorized to accept service. 
Whether actual notice, standing alone, is sufficient to 
assert jurisdiction is not the issue in this case. This case 
involves actual knowledge of the case through notification sent 
through the mail, and further service of process on an employee 
of defendant at the corporate headquarters after that employee 
has represented to the process server that he was authorized to 
accept service of process. Further, this case includes the added 
issue of what happened to the summons and complaint served upon 
Rob Mullins. The evidence presented by Nu Skin fails to negate 
the possibility or even the likelihood that Mr. Mullins gave said 
summons and complaint served upon him to Steven Lund or other 
authorized agents of Nu Skin, and the trial court action in 
refusing to allow appellant to take any discovery of Mr. Mullins 
or Nu Skin denied appellant the opportunity to resolve that 
issue. Nu Skin is attempting to evade the logical result of its 
own deliberate inaction. Courts strongly disfavor this kind of 
conduct. As the Utah Court of Appeals noted in a case where the 
defendant had artfully avoided service, "personal service should 
not become a 'degrading game of wiles and tricks."7 Wood v. 
Weening, 736 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Business & 
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Prof. Adi. Co. v. Baker, 62 Or.App. 237, 659 P.2d 1025, 1027 
(1983). 
Furthermore, when a judgment has been entered, 
including a default judgment, this court has stated that the 
burden is on the party attacking jurisdiction to prove its 
absence. State Dept. of Social Services v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130, 
1132 (Utah 1989). Nu Skin failed to contradict the Affidavit of 
Officer Murphy. When a law enforcement officer serves papers to 
a corporate employee at corporate headquarters who has 
affirmatively represented that he has authority to accept service 
of process, jurisdiction is presumed, as the trial court properly 
found in entering the default judgment based on Deputy Murphy's 
Affidavit. Nu Skin should have been required to come forward and 
prove the absence of jurisdiction, which it failed to do. As 
stated above, the Affidavit of Steven Lund, while attempting to 
refute the Affidavit of Deputy Murphy, fails to do so, and Nu 
Skin failed entirely to provide proof of what actually happened 
to the summons and complaint that was served on Rob Mullins. 
IV. 
JUDGE ROKICH ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING COUNSEL 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE AGAINST THE MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, IN SUMMARILY GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND IN DENYING 
COUNSEL THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE DISCOVERY, INCLUDING 
THE DEPOSITION OF ROB MULLINS OF NU SKIN, THE PERSON 
UPON WHOM SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS MADE. 
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At the hearing on Nu Skin's Motion to Quash Service, 
the trial court refused to allow appellant's former counsel to 
argue against said motion, stating words to the effect that "You 
can make your argument, but I have already made my decision." 
The court further summarily granted the Motion to Quash, and 
finally denied former counsel for appellant any opportunity to 
take discovery or a deposition of Rob Mullins in order to 
ascertain what ultimately happened to the summons and complaint 
that was served upon him. At this point we still do not know 
what happened to those, and the evidence provided by Nu Skin 
artfully skirted that issue entirely. If, as appellant suspects, 
Rob Mullins turned said summons and complaint over to Steven Lund 
or another authorized agent of Nu Skin, then appellant's argument 
that the default judgment should have remained would be 
drastically bolstered. However, the trial court refused to allow 
this discovery to occur and in doing so abused its discretion. 
In general, under Rule 26(b)(1), U.R.C.P.: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to 
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or 
to the claim or defense of any other party... 
Clearly, the issues relating to the service of process on Rob 
Mullins, whether he has accepted service of process before or 
after the service in this case, and if so, whether he was ever 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reprimanded by his employer for doing so, and what he did with 
the summons and complaint served upon him in this case are 
"relevant to the subject matter involved" upon which appellant 
should have been allowed to take discovery. 
If the deposition of Mr. Mullins revealed that he was 
in charge of Nu Skin's property, operations, business activities, 
office, place of business, or in some other manner responsible 
for or with control over the affairs of Nu Skin, then service 
would be proper under Rule 4 U.R.C.P. Beard v. White, Green and 
Addison Associates, Inc., 336 P.2d 125 (Utah 1959). This 
determination should have been made by the lower court, following 
discovery relating to the same. 
Furthermore, the Affidavit of Deputy Murphy states that 
Rob Mullins approached her and stated that he was authorized to 
accept service of process. If the deposition of Rob Mullins 
revealed that he was designated by Nu Skin to accept service of 
this or other lawsuits, or that he had done so in the past with 
Nu Skin's knowledge, then also service would have been proper. 
Rule 26(c), U.R.C.P., regarding protective orders, 
states: 
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the 
court in which the action is pending...may make any 
order which justice requires to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense...including...(1) that the 
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discovery not be had...[Emphasis added; portions 
omitted]. 
In this case, there was no motion for a protective order made by 
Nu Skin concerning discovery; there was no good cause shown why 
the discovery should not be allowed; nor was the discovery 
anticipated such that would annoy, embarrass, oppress or subject 
Nu Skin to undue burden or expense. Indeed, there existed no 
reason to deny appellant the opportunity to take discovery 
concerning the service of process on Mr. Mullins. In so denying 
appellant the opportunity to take this discovery, the trial court 
abused its discretion. 
V. 
JUDGE ROKICH ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY 
FEES IN THE MATTER AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL FOR 
HAVING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED. 
Utah Courts have consistently held that attorney's fees 
may only be awarded if there is a statutory or contractual basis 
for the award. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. V. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 
(Utah App. 1989). In this case, the only provision under which 
attorney's fees could be awarded is set forth in U.C.A. §78-27-56 
(1988), which provides in relevant part: 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith. 
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This statute is a codification of the interpretive rule set forth 
in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983), which requires 
three elements to be met before an award may be granted: (1) 
that the party requesting the award of fees by the prevailing 
party; (2) that the action or defense be without merit; and (3) 
that good faith is lacking. If all three elements are not met, 
then no award may be granted. Hermes v. Park's Sportsman, 813 
P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah App. 1991). These three elements were not 
met in the present case. 
While it may be presumed, for sake of argument, that Nu 
Skin was the prevailing party, there is no evidence to support 
the elements that plaintiff's actions were without merit and that 
the plaintiff acted in bad faith. 
In Cady, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "without 
merit" and "frivolous" were synonymous and then defined 
"frivolous" as being "of little weight or importance having no 
basis in law or fact..." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. The court also 
addressed the burden of proof for merit-less actions when it 
stated that "there [must] be substantial evidence that the 
[action] was lacking [a] basis in either law or fact and 
therefore frivolous." Id. at 152. 
It is evident that plaintiff's actions were not without 
merit. The default judgment was entered against Nu Skin in 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compliance with all rules of procedure and rules of practice. 
The plaintiff had an absolute right to obtain a default against a 
non-responsive party. Thus, not only has there been no showing 
of "substantial evidence," there has been no evidence of a merit-
less action. The second element under Cady was not and cannot be 
met. 
Additionally, the third element of bad faith is also 
lacking. The trial court made a finding of bad faith on the part 
of plaintiff's counsel premised on the fact that plaintiff did 
not inform the trial court of the status of Mr. Shuff s [later] 
claimed representation of Nu Skin and on the fact that plaintiff 
failed to notify Mr. Shuff of the notice of intent to take 
default. However, this is not a basis for a finding of bad 
faith. 
Rule 55, U.R.C.P. does not require that any such notice 
be given. It states: 
...[I]t shall not be necessary to give such party in 
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to 
serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these 
rules to be served on a party to the action or 
proceeding. 
This language is clear and unambiguous. A plaintiff is not 
required to give any notice to a party in default nor to their 
attorney. 
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Most importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has squarely 
ruled that opposing counsel need not be notified prior to taking 
a default judgment, despite the fact that counsel for both sides 
had been discussing the very matter in litigation prior to 
obtaining the default. In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 
656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982), the plaintiffs filed a complaint on 
October 23, seeking a judgment for the unpaid balance of the 
defendants' Master Charge account. A summons ^nd complaint was 
mailed to the defendants (pursuant to an order granting 
alternative service) on October 24, but defendants did not 
respond. On November 5, the defendants' attorney Mr. Schwobe 
spoke with plaintiff's attorney over the phone. The next day Mr. 
Schwobe requested copies of the pleadings in a letter to Mr. 
Young. Mr. Young refused to supply the documents in a letter 
dated November 14 unless Mr. Schwobe agreed to appear generally 
in the matter. Mr. Schwobe did not respond nor did he enter a 
general appearance, apparently in the belief that service of 
process was deficient. 
On December 4, a default judgment was entered against 
the defendants without any notice regarding the default or any 
other matter being mailed to or discussed with defendants or 
their counsel with whom Mr. Young had been actively discussing 
the case. On December 8, Mr. Schwobe again requested copies of 
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the pleadings, and on December 31, a copy of the summons and 
complaint was served upon the defendants at their new address. 
On January 22 Mr. Schwobe served an answer and counterclaim on 
Mr. Young, but the answer was returned for failure to attach the 
counterclaim filing fee. On March 5 defendants answer and 
counterclaim was filed, and on March 11, plaintiff filed a motion 
to strike the same on the basis of the default judgment. On 
March 17, defendants filed a motion to set aside the default 
judgment alleging defective process and inadequate notice of the 
default judgment. 
To the defendants7 contentions in Central Bank that 
ongoing communications between the attorneys created an 
obligation to notify opposing counsel of the default, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that under the clear language of Rule 5, 55 
and 77, U.R.C.P., "plaintiff was under no duty to notify 
defendants of the default." Id. at 1011. The Supreme Court in a 
unanimous decision further stated: 
We are satisfied that defendants had actual notice of 
the suit filed against them. Indeed, that fact has 
never been denied or controverted. The defendants 
knowingly shirked their duty to respond, and they have 
no valid basis for setting the default aside. 
Id. at 1012. 
In the present case, there is no dispute that Nu Skin 
had actual notice of the suit. As the trial court was advised on 
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July 21, 1992, plaintiff wanted to further develop the facts 
surrounding Nu Skin's receipt of the notice of intent to take 
default, and of the service of the summons and complaint on Rob 
Mullins. For this purpose, plaintiff requested that he be 
permitted to depose certain Nu Skin employees. This request was 
denied in a telephone conference between the parties and the 
trial court on July 21, 1992. 
The court in Central Bank further found that 
plaintiff's actions "did nothing to lull the defendants into a 
false sense of security that would justify them in not taking any 
further action." 
The Central Bank case and the present case have a lot 
of similarities. However, in the present case, the discussions 
between counsel did not even involve the case in which the 
default judgment was taken, but rather involved a case pending in 
California and likewise did nothing to lull the defendants into a 
false sense of security. (Affidavit of Jeffrey Brown, paragraphs 
3 through 5). Further, the Notice of Intent to take Default was 
sent to Nu Skin International, Inc., c/o Rob Mullins, because 
counsel believed that was the proper thing to do. It was not 
sent to Mr. Shuff because it was believed that he would not be 
involved in the Utah case until and unless plaintiff dismissed 
his appeal of the California lawsuit. (Affidavit of Jeffrey B. 
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Brown, paragraph 5). Indeed, counsel complied with Rule 5(b) in 
mailing the Notice of Intent to take Default directly to Nu Skin, 
particularly where no counsel had entered an appearance. 
Apparently the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision dated 
August 3, 1992, based the award of the attorney fees upon the 
condition imposed by the court "as a condition to entry of 
Judgment that notice of intent to take a default judgment be 
given to a proper party." Apparently, while not specifically 
stated, the court believed that notice given directly to Nu Skin, 
c/o Rob Mullins, the person who had been served on behalf of Nu 
Skin, was not adequate in the court's mind. However, counsel for 
plaintiff was left at the time with no specific directions as to 
what was a proper notice, and was penalized later when the trial 
court unilaterally decided that the notice was improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The default judgment was properly entered against Nu 
Skin International, Inc. for its failure to timely respond to the 
summons and complaint properly served upon its employee at its 
corporate headquarter who affirmatively represented to the 
process server that he was authorized to accept service of 
process. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
judgment to summarily quash service of process, to deny counsel 
the opportunity to argue against the motion, to deny appellant 
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the opportunity to take discovery on the issues surrounding the 
service of process and notice of intent to take default, and it 
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award attorney 
fees against plaintiff under the circumstances. The matter 
should be remanded with directions to the trial court to 
reinstate the default judgment, and to award no attorney fees to 
Nu Skin. 
DATED this day of February, 1993. 
BROWN & BROWN 
Jeffrey B. Brown, Esq. 
Budge W. Call, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 
1993, I caused to be mailed, first class postage prepaid, four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing to each party separately 
represented in care of the following: 
John D. Shuff, Esq. 
ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI 
444 Market Street, Suite 2700 
San Francisco, California 94109 
Michael D. Smith, Esq. 
NU SKIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
75 West Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
3 511brinuski.bro 
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